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Sofia Fellini, Riccardo Vesipa, Fulvio Boano and Luca RidolfiABSTRACTQ1This work presents an algorithm for real-time fault detection in the SCADA system of a modern water
supply system (WSS) in an Italian alpine valley. By means of both hardware and analytical
redundancy, the proposed algorithm compares data and isolates faults on sensors through analysis
of residuals. Moreover, the algorithm performs a real-time selection of the most reliable
measurements for the automated control of the WSS operations. A coupled model of the hydraulic
and remote-control system is developed to test the performance of the WSS when the proposed
algorithm is applied or not. Simulations show that the occurrence of errors in the sensors causes
significant worsening in the economic, energy and mechanical performance of the infrastructure.
In many cases, the operations of the WSS are seriously compromised. The error detection and
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INTRODUCTIONIn north Italian mountainous and hilly areas, water supply
(WS) to local communities is usually provided by municipal
water supply systems (WSSs) that rely on local sources and
operate independently from each other. In these regions, in
fact, the availability of water resources is generally not an
issue, and the high degree of territorial dispersion favors a
decentralized water management. In the event of unex-
pected breakdowns or droughts (Carrera et al. ),
however, this fragmentation results in inefficiencies and
water crises. In order to increase the resilience of the WS
service, a growing trend is the creation of inter-municipal
water networks that connect multiple local WSSs over
large areas (Massarutto ). Coordination in the oper-
ations of multiple WSSs and diversification of water
sources entail economic, environmental, and water quality
advantages (Anghileri et al. ; Bel & Warner ), and
they are in line with the principle of integrated water
resources management pursued by the European Water
Framework Directive (EC ).Large-scale water infrastructures require an automated
regulation aimed at controlling the operations of the entire
system, according to a centralized control philosophy. For
this reason, they are managed by SCADA (Supervisory Con-
trol and Data Acquisition) systems (e.g., Coelho & Andrade-
Campos ; Meseguer & Quevedo ) that (i) acquire
and analyze real-time pressure and flow rate measurements
provided by sensors in the key points of the network, and (ii)
remotely control the operations of the regulation devices
(e.g., valves, pumps, turbines), according to predefined man-
agement rules and as a function of the data measured in real-
time throughout the system.
In this framework, faulty sensors in the system may
induce the SCADA to perform wrong regulations and,
thus, result in faulty water supply system (WSS) operations.
To ensure the robustness of the control operations, control
systems have to be integrated with procedures that detect
errors in sensors and activate in response actions for a
safe management. This is crucial for large hydraulic
Q2
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Uncorrected Proofinfrastructures that transfer and supply water over large and
steep areas. These systems are particularly vulnerable to fail-
ures, as the large volumes of water and the high pressures
involved can cause dangerous consequences when the
system regulation is not optimal.
Fault detection and isolation (FDI) methods have been
proposed in different fields of engineering and can be
roughly classified into signal-based and method-based tech-
niques (Gao et al. ).
Basic signal-based methods (e.g., Mourad & Bertrand-
Krajewski ; Burnell ) evaluate data as valid or
faulty by assessing the value or the variation of the signal.
Advanced signal-based methods (e.g., Frank & Köppen-
Seliger ; Maki & Loparo ) include techniques
from machine learning, like neural networks. Signal-based
methods are generally used when measurement redundancy
is not available in the system, when the number of sensors
under analysis is huge, and when a model of the system
cannot be developed.
On the other hand, model-based methods validate data
by using dependencies between different measurable signals.
To this aim, both hardware redundancy or analytical redun-
dancy (Hwang et al. ; Gertler ) can be exploited. In
hardware redundancy, measurements of the same physical
variable are acquired by redundant sensors and compared.
Conversely, analytical redundancy uses a mathematical
model of the system as a comparison term (Frank ;
Isermann ). Hardware redundancy is commonly
adopted in safety-critical systems (Goupil ), but it
involves significant extra costs. Moreover, sensors tend to
have a similar lifetime and thus sensors that were installed
at the same time in the infrastructure often fail simul-
taneously. In large-scale systems, analytical redundancy
represents a convenient alternative due to the number of
sensors, and the high cost of their installation, interconnec-
tion, and maintenance (Boukhris et al. ). Fault detection
in model-based methods involves two steps: (i) residual gen-
eration and (ii) residual evaluation. A residual is obtained as
the difference between two redundant measurements. Its
signal is ideally zero when the system is operating correctly
and non-zero when faults are present. Residual evaluation is
the set of techniques that correctly identify the occurrence of
an error starting from the analysis of the residuals (Frank &
Ding ).FDI techniques have been widely studied in the field of
control engineering, such as in industrial plants (e.g., Gertler
; Özyurt & Pike ) and in automotive and aerospace
engineering (Chen & Patton ). In the hydraulic and
hydrological field, applications of FDI involved the analysis
and reconstruction of hydrological time-series (e.g.,
Quevedo et al. ), leak/burst detection in water distri-
bution networks (e.g., Krause et al. ; Casillas et al.
), and problems related to water quality monitoring
(e.g., Eliades & Polycarpou ). A few works instead
dealt with the identification of faulty sensors for a safe
remote control of WSSs. Among these, Gabrys & Bargiela
() determined confidence intervals for flow rate
measurements by means of a neural network approach.
Ragot & Maquin () proposed a method based on
fuzzy logic for measurement fault detection in an urban
WSS. Izquierdo et al. () applied a FDI hybrid method
based on neural networks and fuzzy theory. Meseguer
et al. () and Cugueró-Escofet et al. () used fault sig-
nature matrices to identify a faulty sensor by means of the
effect that the wrong measurement transmitted by this
sensor potentially has on the other variables measured in
the system. These methods proved to be efficient but their
implementation in real hydraulic systems requires a certain
degree of control theory expertise and a relevant compu-
tational cost.
Starting from the work of Fellini et al. (), the goal of
this paper is to present an easy-to-implement and robust
algorithm for fault detection in the SCADA system of a
modern WSS. To increase the safety and the reliability of
the control system, measurements from sensors are assessed
in real time. By the analysis of residuals, redundant measure-
ments are compared, and faults are automatically detected.
Moreover, in case of errors, the developed algorithm ensures
continuity in the control operations and prevents interrup-
tions in the water supply. In addition to the introduction
of a new FDI method, tools for the application and vali-
dation of the algorithm in typical WSSs are also provided
in this work. In this way, the application of the method to
real WSSs is facilitated.
The work is organized as follows. After this introduc-
tion, the ‘Materials and methods’ section presents first the
logic and the structure of the proposed algorithm for fault
detection. Then, the application of the algorithm to a
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the ‘Materials and methods’ section, the developed tools
for the validation of the proposed algorithm are described.
In the ‘Results’ section, the performances of the WSS
before and after the application of the fault detection
method are assessed. Finally, the main conclusions obtained
from the present work are drawn.Figure 1 | Algorithm for fault detection (Step I) in a WSS sensors and for the choice of the
most reliable measurement (Step II) to be used in the control operations.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Algorithm for fault detection in sensors
An easy-to-implement and robust method for real-time fault
detection in the SCADA system of a WSS has been devel-
oped. This method is based on the redundancy concept
and thus can be applied when different measurements of
the same physical quantity are available.
Usually, critical sensors in a SCADA system are dupli-
cated. However, double redundancy provides error
detection but not recovery. In fact, if two different measure-
ments are read by two redundant sensors, the supervisory
system can easily detect the presence of an error but
cannot automatically recognize which one is the faulty
device. In this case, a technician’s on-site intervention is
the only solution to identify the problematic sensor, and
this may lead to an interruption of the control operations
of the WSS. In large-scale water infrastructures, this inter-
ruption is extremely unsafe.
To guarantee continuity in real-time control operations,
a procedure for the automatic detection and correction of
faulty measurements is thus required. This is achieved with
an error detection system based on triple redundancy. In
this case, if one of the three sensors fails, the other two sen-
sors can isolate the faulty sensor and provide a useful and
reliable measurement.
The algorithm we present detects faults by comparing
three values of the same physical variable, provided by
two redundant gauges (hardware redundancy) and by a
hydraulic equation (analytical redundancy). In this way, resi-
lience is achieved and the expensive installation of three
redundant sensors is avoided.
In particular, the fault detection algorithm (Figure 1)
receives as input three values (A, B, and C) of the sameobserved variable (e.g., water level in a tank or flow rate
along a pipe). A and B are transmitted by two redundant
sensors, while C is obtained from a hydraulic balance.
Residuals R1, R2, and R3 are generated by calculating the
difference between measurements two by two:
R1 ¼ A B, R2 ¼ B C, R3 ¼ A C (1)
Due to instrumental precision, random errors (see the
‘Error modeling’ section) are intrinsic in instrumental read-
ings and therefore residuals are generally non-zero even if
no errors are present. For this reason, faults are detected
by comparing each residual to its tolerance. The tolerance
intervals are defined in order to include precision errors, as:
tolR1 ¼ tolA þ tolB, tolR2 ¼ tolB þ tolC , tolR3 ¼ tolA þ tolC ,
(2)
where tolA, tolB, and tolC are the maximum instrumental
errors expected for measurements A, B, and C, respectively.
If the i-th residual exceeds its tolerance, the i-th error vari-
able, Ei, switches to 1 (e.g., if jR1j> tolR1, E1 ¼ 1). When a
sensor fails, two of the three error variables (E1, E2, and
E3 in Figure 1) assume value equal to 1, since the error
associated with a single measurement appears in the calcu-
lation of two residuals. As a consequence, the algorithm can
automatically detect which one is the faulty sensor (e.g., if
R1 and R3 are out of tolerance, the sensor providing
measurement A is identified as faulty).
Besides real-time error detection, the developed algor-
ithm automatically selects the most accurate data to be
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in Figure 1). For each set of three measurements (A, B, C),
the minimum residual is identified (M in Figure 1). The
two measurements involved in the calculation of M are
the closest to each other and therefore considered the
most representative of the real physical value. The algorithm
selects one (X in Figure 1) of these two measurements as
input for the control operations. This last choice is based
on technical considerations. Generally, priority is given to
direct measurements compared to indirect ones (i.e., those
calculated from quantities different from the measured
one). For example, in Figure 1, whenM ¼ R1 the algorithm
selects A as the input for the control operations. Measure-
ment B would have been an equally correct datum but for
technical reasons A is considered more reliable (e.g., A is
directly given by a sensor while B is obtained from a hydrau-
lic balance or from a sensor with lower instrumental
precision).
The here-presented algorithm is designed for real-time
applications. In remote-controlled WSSs, programmable
logic controllers (PLC), networked to the SCADA systems,
receive measurements from the sensors. The fault detection
algorithm is implemented in the PLCs and evaluates the
reliability of these measurements. Reliable measurements
are thus selected by the algorithm and adopted for the man-
agement of the control devices (e.g., valves, turbines). The
frequency for this measurement check is case specific. It
can be lower than the data acquisition frequency but has
to be higher than the frequency of the adjustment oper-
ations, and therefore of the rate of variation of the
hydraulic properties in the system.
Application of the algorithm to a real WSS
The proposed algorithm for fault detection and measure-
ment assessment is non-specific and applies to WSSs with
three basic requirements: (i) a SCADA communication net-
work collects measurements from sensors throughout the
system; (ii) programmable logic controllers (PLCs) operate
the control devices (e.g., valves, turbines) according to the
dynamics of a number of measured variables (e.g., flow
rates, tank levels); (iii) three independent measurements of
each control variable can be obtained from redundant sen-
sors or models. A case study is introduced to improve theunderstanding of the method, to present a real application,
and to show some useful tools for its validation.
Case study
The case study is described in detail by Fellini et al. ()
and involves a modern WSS (Figure 2) located in an
Alpine valley in the northwest of Italy. The WSS consists
of an 80-km-long water main connecting 20 municipal
WSSs. The water main collects high quality water from an
alpine reservoir and conveys a maximum flow rate of
500 l/s. The municipal WSSs (see the inset in Figure 2) are
self-sufficient under ordinary conditions as they are supplied
by local sources (springs and wells). However, they receive
water from the water main when the local sources fail,
their quality is low, or water treatment in local plants is
expensive. Needle valves with electronic actuators regulate
the flow delivered from the water main to the municipal
tanks. In the upper valley, four inline tanks (S1, S2, S3, and
S4) split the water main in order to limit the static water
pressure in the pipes. A Pelton turbine with electronically
controlled Doble needles adjusts the flow entering in each
inline tank. In this way, hydropower generation is also
performed.
Valves and turbines are the active elements that regulate
the flow rate in the entire WSS. Local PLCs control these
devices according to (i) predefined management rules, (ii)
flow rate and level data measured by sensors installed near
the regulation devices, and (iii) data received from the dis-
tant sensors networked in the SCADA system. Data
transmission in the SCADA system is guaranteed by an
optical fiber network.
The management rules of the active devices were devel-
oped to optimize water distribution and to maximize the
hydropower generation and the energy saving in the entire
system (Fellini et al. ). In particular, flow adjustment
through the turbines is aimed at (i) maintaining the water
level in the inline tanks between two predefined level
thresholds and (ii) minimizing the number of turbine oper-
ations. To this aim, turbines T1 and T2 are regulated
according to the water level in the upstream tanks S1 and
S2, respectively. An upper and a lower level threshold are
predefined for each one of these tanks. When the water
level crosses one of these thresholds, the status of the
Figure 2 | Scheme of the WSS adopted as case study. The water main is split by four main tanks (the rectangles denominated S1–S4) and it supplies 20 municipal tanks (the small white
squares). The inset shows a typical municipal water system with the storage tank supplied by mountain springs, local wells, and by the new water main. The flow rate and level
sensors involved in the regulation operations are respectively represented as small diamonds and arrows overlaid by a circle. The control devices, i.e., needle valves and
turbines, are depicted as ‘bow tie’ symbols and square with cross symbols.
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the flow rate through the turbine is calculated by the
SCADA system in order to close the balance:
QT ¼ QIN 
X
i
QEX,i (3)
where QIN is the flow rate entering the tank and QEX,i is the
flow rate supplied to the i-th municipal WSS along the pipe-
line segment between the tank and the turbine. QT value is
rounded up when the crossed threshold is the higher one.
It is rounded down when the crossed threshold is the
lower one. In this way, the water level slowly varies between
the two thresholds and the number of turbine adjustments is
minimized. An additional minimum threshold is set to avoid
the emptying of the tank (i.e., to prevent air from entering
the water main) in emergency conditions. When the water
level falls below this threshold the downstream turbine is
completely closed. The same rationale is used to control
the flow rate through turbine T3. However, the regulationis performed according to the water level in the downstream
tank S4. As a consequence, in Equation (3), the flow rate out
of the tank (Q5 in Figure 2) appears instead of QIN , and
when the emergency threshold in tank S4 is crossed, turbine
T3 is fully opened. The involved measurements for the con-
trol of the turbines are thus given by the level sensors in the
inline tanks (L1 to L4) and by the flow rate sensors installed
along the water main (e.g., Q4 and Q5) and along the pipes
that supply the municipal tanks of the upper valley (e.g.,
Q1 to Q3).
The water level in the inline tank S3 is instead used to
control the flow rate towards the municipal tanks in order
to optimize the distribution of water in the whole system.
Tank S3 has the largest capacity, and thus its level is an indi-
cator of water availability in the system. According to L3
dynamics and to a predefined priority list (based on techni-
cal and economic criteria), the municipal WSSs to be
supplied by the water main are selected. Alternatively, the
municipal tanks are supplied by the local wells. In both
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the tank water level. As for the inline tanks, an emergency
level threshold is set for the municipal tanks. When the
water level falls below this threshold, the water main
supplies the tank with a predefined constant flow rate. The
involved measurements for the control of the needle
valves are thus given by level sensors in the municipal
tanks (e.g., L5 to L16) and by L3.
Notice that all the municipal WSSs are actually pro-
vided with meters. However, the level and flow rate
sensors of four of them are not shown in Figure 2. These sen-
sors are not considered in the simulations discussed in the
following sections because the management rules in which
they are involved are rather specific.Assessment of hardware and analytical redundancy
in the system
The above-presented fault isolation procedure is effective if
three measurements A, B, and C of the same physical quan-
tity are available. As introduced in the ‘Case study’ section,
the key quantities for the control operations are: (i) water
levels in the inline tanks (L1 to L4 in Figure 2) and in the
municipal tanks (L5 to L16); and (ii) flow rates along the
water main (Q4 and Q5) and towards the municipal WSSs
in the upper valley (Q1 to Q3).
Regarding level measurements, each tank is equipped
with two redundant level sensors (MH1 and MH2 in
Figure 3(a)). Moreover, the tank level can be evaluatedFigure 3 | (a) Level (MH1 andMH2) and flow rate (MQIN andMQOUT ) sensors installed in the tank
and C) of the tank level. (b) Flow rate sensors installed along the pipe that supply the
equations provides three redundant values (A, B, and C) of the flow rate towards the
MQ2), along the water main (MQA ), and along the pipes that supply the municipal tan
rate into the inline tank.with a mass balance equation that estimates the actual
tank level (C in Figure 3(a)) as a function of the tank level
in the previous time step (Δt), the tank area (AT ), and the
flow rates into and out of the tank (MQIN and MQOUT in
Figure 3(a)):
C(t) ¼ C(t Δt)þ [MQIN(t Δt)MQOUT (t Δt)] ΔtAT (4)
Notice that this balance is independent from the level
measurement sent by sensors MH1 and MH2. Otherwise,
any error in one of the two level sensors would also propa-
gate within C and the error identification method would fail.
Regarding flow rate measurements towards the munici-
palities, two flow meters are installed along the pipes that
supply each municipal tank. Generally, one is installed
near the tank and the other at the connection to the water
main (MQ1 and MQ2 in Figure 3(b)). Furthermore, some
flow meters intercept the water main (MQA and MQB in
Figure 3(b)). Thus, a third value (C) of the flow rate towards
each one of the local WSSs can be evaluated with the fol-
lowing flow rate balance equation:
C(t) ¼MQA(t)MQB(t) (5)
Finally, for the flow rates along the water main (Q4 and
Q5 in Figure 2), redundant flow rate sensors at the entrance
and at the exit of the inline tanks are installed (Figure 3(c)).
The flow rate balance (Equation (5)) is used to compute the
third redundant measurement.s (with area AT ) of the WSS. The system of equations provides three redundant values (A, B,
municipal tanks (MQ1 and MQ2) and along the water main (MQA and MQB). The system of
municipal tank. (c) Flow rate sensors installed at the entrance of the inline tanks (MQ1 and
ks (MQB). The system of equations provides three redundant values (A, B, and C) of the flow
Figure 4 | Residuals Q7(continuous lines) and their tolerance intervals (dashed lines) for
level measurement in tank S1. Level sensor MH1 is affected by drift. Conse-
quently, residuals R1 and R3 present a drifted signal and exceed their
respective tolerance ranges. The tolerance intervals of residuals R2 and R3 are
not constant as they are a function of tolC (see Equation (9)).
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In the proposed error detection algorithm, a tolerance inter-
val for each residual has to be defined. Within this interval
the residual is accepted. The tolerance interval is obtained
from the sum of the maximum precision errors expected
for the two measurements involved in the calculation of
the residual, i.e., a combination of two between tolA, tolB,
and tolC (see Equation (2)).
For flow rate measurements (Figure 3(b) and 3(c)), tolA
and tolB are set as the maximum instrumental error (Emax) of
the installed flow meters. tolC is the maximum precision
error expected for the indirect estimation (C) of the flow
rate. Equation (5) defines C as a linear combination of
flow rate measurements MQA and MQB. For this kind of
indirect measurement, the uncertainty is determined by
the law of propagation of uncertainty (JCGM ). In the
case of linear models, the law of propagation states that
the variance of an indirect measurement is given by a quad-
ratic combination of the variance of the directly measured
quantities. Referring to Equation (5), the variance of C
reads:
σ2C ¼ σ2MQA þ σ2MQB (6)
Assuming a Gaussian distribution for the measurement
results, the maximum precision error can be estimated as
three times the standard deviation. As a consequence, tolC
becomes:
tolC ¼ 3σC ¼ 3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2MQA þ σ2MQB
q
(7)
where the variance of the flow rate measurementsMQA and
MQB is obtained as a function of their maximum instrumen-
tal error:
σ2MQA ¼
Emax,MQA
3
 2
, σ2MQB ¼
Emax,MQB
3
 2
(8)
Similarly, for level measurements (Figure 3(a)), tolA and
tolB are set as the maximum instrumental error stated for the
installed level sensors (MH1 andMH2). tolC is the maximum
precision error expected for the indirect estimation of thetank level, obtained from the mass balance in Equation
(4). Considering the law of propagation of uncertainty, tolC
for the level measurement at time t reads:
tolC,t ¼ 3σC,t
¼ 3
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
tolC,tΔt
3
 2
þ (E2max,MQIN þ E2max,MQOUT )
Δt
3 AT
 2s
(9)
In Equation (9), tolC increases with each time step. To
avoid this progressive growth of the tolerance range and to
keep it significant in the validation process, tolC is forced
equal to tolA when it exceeds a threshold value equal to
twice the tolerance of the installed level sensors (e.g., tolA).
Kalman filters (e.g., Piatyszek et al. ; Ciavatta et al.
) could be used alternatively to Equations (4) and (9) to
produce an estimate of the variable C, with its uncertainty
σC . However, to reduce the uncertainty related to the mod-
eled variable C, Kalman filters require a recursive update of
the estimated variable based on the real value measured by a
sensor. In the method proposed in this work, however, C has
to be independent from the measured values (i.e., A and B).
For this reason, the implementation of Kalman filters is here
avoided.
Figure 4 shows the residuals R1, R2, and R3 and their
tolerance intervals (see Equations (1) and (2)) for the assess-
ment of the level measurement in tank S1. The tolerance
Table 1 | Types of considered errors in sensors and their simulation in the control model
of the WSS
Type of error Subtype Error simulation
Random
error
– Gaussian distribution with μ¼ 0
and σ¼Emax/3
Drift Zero drift Instrument calibration curve
with intercept increasing over
time from 0 to 20% of the
instrument full-scale
Sensitivity drift Instrument calibration curve
with angular coefficient
increasing over time from 1 to
1.2
Breakdown Minimum
constant value
Zero constant value
Maximum
constant value
Constant value stuck at the
instrument full-scale
Abrupt
oscillations
Binomial distribution taking
value 0 or the instrument full-
scale with equal probability
0.5
Loss of
signal
– NaN
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trend of interrupted growth as R2 and R3 are a function of
tolC. In the proposed example, the level sensor MH1 is
affected by drift (see section ‘Error modeling’). As a conse-
quence, residuals R1 and R3 exceed their tolerance
intervals and the sensor malfunction is detected.
In the considered WSS, flow rate is measured by electro-
magnetic flow meters with a maximum instrumental error
(Emax) equal to 0.25% of the flow rate in transit, while levels
are measured by ultrasonic level sensors with Emax equal to
0.15% of the full-scale (this latter is equal to 6 meters).
Tools for the validation of the fault detection algorithm
The efficacy of the proposed algorithm in detecting errors in
sensors is assessed through numerical simulations. To per-
form these simulations, a numerical model of the hydraulic
and control operations is developed, and realistic errors in
sensors are simulated. To assess in a quantitativeway the per-
formance of the WSS under the different simulated
scenarios, custom performance indexes are introduced.
Hydraulic and control model
A simulation model was developed to analyze the perform-
ances of the WSS in different scenarios (Fellini et al. ).
This model consists of a coupled hydraulic and control
model.
The hydraulic model is a system of non-linear equations
describing (i) the flow-head loss relation in pipes, at valves
and at turbines, (ii) the flow continuity at nodes, and (iii)
the boundary conditions at tanks. Time evolution of the
system is modeled by a succession of steady states with dur-
ation Δt. At each time step, the flow in the pipes and the
pressure at nodes are computed. Moreover, the water level
in tanks is updated using a mass balance equation.
The control model simulates the supervision and control
operations of the SCADA system. A measurement from each
one of the installed sensors is modeled as m ¼M þ ϵ, where
M is the flow or level computed by the hydraulic model at
the exact point where the sensor is located. This value is per-
turbed with the error ε to model different kinds of sensor
faults. These measurements are used as input data for the
decision-making algorithms that simulate the controlactions of the SCADA system, that is, the governance of
valves and turbines.Error modeling
Measurement errors are of different types and originate from
different causes. In this work, we simulate errors that usually
affect meters in monitoring systems (Balaban et al. ;
Sharma et al. ). These are: random errors, instrumental
drifts, sensor breakdowns and interruption of signal trans-
mission (Table 1).
Random errors (also called statistical errors) are intrin-
sic errors that depend on the precision limitation of the
measurement devices (e.g., Fuller ). In the simulated
control system, random errors are modeled as realizations
of a Gaussian distribution with mean equal to zero and
with a standard deviation that depends on the instrumental
precision. In particular, according to the three-sigma rule
(Pukelsheim ), we estimate the standard deviation as
one-third the maximum instrumental error (Emax).
Instrumental drift is a progressive bias in the measure-
ment output which increases slowly in time (e.g., Webster
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mechanical wear. In unaltered meters, the relation between
the input (i.e., the value of the physical variable) and the
output (i.e., the measurement) of the measurement process
is a bisector. When this ideal bisector moves vertically, i.e.,
the instrument output has an offset with respect to the
input, the meter is affected by ‘zero drift’. This offset may
increase over time. When the angular coefficient of the
bisector changes over time, the sensor is affected by ‘sensi-
tivity drift’. In the simulated control model, the calibration
curve of the instrument is disturbed by (i) an increase of
the offset from zero to 20% of the instrument full-scale
occurring over 10 days, and (ii) by a 20% increment of the
angular coefficient over the same period.
Sensor breakdowns are usually caused by mechanical
damage or electrical issues in internal connections. In the
event of a breakdown, the operation of the meter is compro-
mised, and the measured quantity deviates completely from
the measured physical variable, i.e., the sensor output is
usually stuck at a constant value equal to the full-scale of
the instrument or to the minimum detectable value. Alterna-
tively, the measure oscillates unstably between these two
values. Stuck sensors are simulated in the control model
by setting the measured value on the minimum detectable
value or on the full-scale of the instrument. Unstable oscil-
lations are generated through a random extraction over
time between these two extremes.
Loss of signal is a complete loss of sensor data, due to a
failure in the sensor or in the transmission network. In this
case, the sensor output is simulated as a NaN (i.e., Not a
Number).
Performance indexes
To analyze the operations of the hydraulic system in scen-
arios with different failures of the sensors, we introduce
four performance indices. The first one is a normalized
index of the time to breakdown, calculated as:
IT ¼ Tfin
Tsim
(10)
where Tfin is the time in which the WSS operates without
criticalities (i.e., empty conditions in the tanks), while Tsimis the total simulation time (one month). If IT < 1, errors
in sensors are responsible for the failure of the WSS.
For the simulations with IT ¼ 1, three additional nor-
malized indexes are calculated. As detailed in the ‘Case
study’ section, the aim of the studied WSS is to supply
high quality water and to generate hydropower electricity.
Thus, to analyze the performance of the system we calculate
the performance quantities
E ¼ Net Energy ¼ ET  EP (11)
W ¼ Lost water ¼ Volover (12)
M ¼ Number of turbine operations
¼ nT1 þ nT2 þ nT3 (13)
ET and EP are respectively the energy generated by the
three turbines and the energy absorbed by the pumping
plants that supply the local tanks. The difference between
these two quantities corresponds to the green net energy
produced by the system. Volover is the total volume of over-
flown water at tanks. When water flows are not properly
governed, this parameter is greater than zero and quantifies
the lost water in the system. nT1, nT2, and nT3 are the
number of flow adjustments in the three turbines. For the
hydraulic stability of the control devices (Vesipa & Fellini
) and for mechanical weariness, this parameter is
optimal when minimized.
These metrics are compared with those obtained for the
benchmark simulation, that is, the simulation of an ideal be-
havior of the system, with optimal measurement acquisition
by the sensors. This simulation is a reference for the other
scenarios and is hereinafter referred to as the benchmark
(‘B’). The following normalized indexes can thus be defined:
IE ¼ E
EB
, IW ¼Wmax W
Wmax
, IM ¼MB
M
(14)
where Wmax is the maximum lost water among all the simu-
lations. These indexes are equal to 1 when the performance
of the disturbed system is the same as in the benchmark
case. Indexes tend to zero as the system performance wor-
sens due to faulty sensors. The water index (IW) is always
between 0 and 1 since the lost water in the benchmark simu-
lation is zero. Index IE(IM) can take values greater than 1, if
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is higher (lower) than in the benchmark simulation. How-
ever, even if one of the indices is greater than 1, the
overall performance of the WSS is always expected to be
worse than in the benchmark case.RESULTS
Numerical simulations of the WSS operations are per-
formed to (i) analyze the effects of the transmission of
faulty measurements from the meters to the telecontrol
system and (ii) verify the efficiency of the error identification
algorithm.
First, we simulate the operation of the WSS in the case
of errors in the sensors and complete lack of measurement
redundancy. Then, the error identification algorithm is intro-
duced into the control model, the same error scenarios are
reproduced, and the resilience of the system is investigated.
In these analyses, only the measurements that are essen-
tial for the WSS control operations are considered. These
measurements are: the water level in the inline and munici-
pal tanks (L1–L16) and the flow rate along the water main
and towards the municipal tanks of the upper valley
(Q1–Q5). In Figure 2 and in the ‘Case study’ section, details
are given about the location of these measurements and how
they are involved in the control operations.Figure 5 | (a) Normalized time to breakdown (index IT) for the three different types of errors. (
IT ¼ 1. Circle and triangle markers represent the results for simulations with drift a
chart, while a different shade of the marker fill is assigned according to the mechaFor each of these measurements, three different kinds of
errors are simulated: (i) drift, (ii) constant minimum value,
and (iii) constant full-scale value. Moreover, in all the simu-
lations, the measurements are disturbed by random errors
due to instrumental precision. Interruption of signal trans-
mission and abrupt oscillations in the instrument output
were also tested. Differently from measurement errors, the
lack of signal is easily detected by the control system even
without a specific error detection algorithm. Abrupt oscil-
lations are instead quite rare. For these reasons, and for
the sake of conciseness, the results of these simulations
are not discussed in the following.Performances of the WSS without application of the
validation algorithm
In Figure 5, the performances of the WSS, without the appli-
cation of the algorithm for fault detection, are shown. In
these simulations, one sensor at a time is affected by
errors. Three different types of errors are analyzed: (i)
drift, (ii) minimum constant value, and (iii) maximum full-
scale value. Only the sensors that are essential for the
WSS control operations are considered. In Figure 5(a), the
IT index for the different scenarios is reported. Level and
flow rate meters are ranked on the x axis according to the
IT value. For the simulations with IT ¼ 1, the sensors areQ7b) Visualization of the three performance indexes (IW, IE, and IM) for the simulations with
nd constant minimum value errors, indexes IW and IE are reported in the log axes of the
nical index value (IM).
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In Figure 5(b), the simulations with IT ¼ 1 are reported as a
function of the three performance indexes IE, IW , and IM.
Since the index values are highly concentrated around 1, a
better readability is obtained using logarithmic axes of the
quantities 1 IE and 1 IW , and using a logarithmic
scale for the shade of the marker fill that represents the
quantity 1 IM. In this way, the best scenarios are located
near the origin of the axes and present blank markers. The
results of the benchmark simulation cannot be visualized
on this graph since zero values cannot be represented on a
logarithmic scale.
Drift error (first panel in Figure 5(a) and triangle mar-
kers in Figure 5(b)) mainly affects level sensors in the
municipal tanks. In fact, level sensors L1 to L16 are charac-
terized by IT < 1. Based on the drifted level signal, the water
level in the tank is overestimated by the SCADA and thus
the water flow to the tank from both the water main or
the local wells is under-rated and insufficient to match
local water consumptions. Drift errors in the level sensors
of the four inline tanks (L1 to L4) are less critical and jeopar-
dize the system operations only in the long term. In
particular, sensors L1, L2, and L4 are rather resilient and
their performances are comparable with the benchmark
case (see Figure 5(b)). Regarding flow rate sensors, no criti-
calities are evident except for Q4, that is, the flow meter
involved in the regulation of the T2 turbine and thus in the
regulation of the water level in S2. This tank is characterized
by the smallest volume compared to the other inline tanks,
so it is more vulnerable to errors in flow rate measurements.
Considering the performances of the WSS under the effect
of drifted flow rate measurements to the municipal tanks
of the upper valley (Q1, Q2, and Q3), an overestimated
flow rate induces a reduction of the flow discharged by the
turbines (see Equation (3)), a lower hydroelectric pro-
duction and thus a decrease of the IE index. Moreover,
the flow rate balances that govern the opening and closing
operations of the turbines are altered and thus a decrease
of IM index is also observed.
When the faulty sensor settles to the minimum constant
value (second panel in Figure 5(a) and circle markers in
Figure 5(b)), the WSS operation is generally not compro-
mised. A wrong minimum level in the municipal water
tanks (L5 to L16) entails an excessive water inflow fromthe local wells and thus a greater energy consumption by
the pumping plants and water loss due to water overflowing
from the tank. For these reasons, both the IW and IE
indexes greatly decrease (Figure 5(b)). However, critical
emptying of the municipal tanks does not occur. On the
other hand, inline tanks are more vulnerable to this kind
of error since emergency water supply from local wells is
not provided. Based on a wrong minimum water level in
tanks S1(S2), the SCADA system forces a complete closure
(see the ‘Case study’ section) of turbine T1(T2) thus impeding
the water supply of the downstream tank S2(S3). Given its
size, tank S2 is emptied when this error arises in sensor
L1. Similarly, when a minimum level is measured in tank
S4, turbine T3 is completely opened and the upstream tank
S3 is critically emptied. For these reasons, L1 and L4 show
the highest vulnerability to this kind of error. A decrease
of IE and IM indexes is observed for errors in the flow
rate measurements that disturb the flow rate balances for
the regulation of turbine operations (Q1, Q2, and Q3 in
Figure 5(b)).
Errors inducing wrong full-scale measurements of level
or flow rate in the devices are the most critical for the
remote-control system. In municipal tanks, if the level
meter indicates that the tank is full, then the tank is not sup-
plied either from the WSS water main or from local sources,
and it quickly empties. In inline tanks, based on a wrong
maximum level in S1 and S2(S4), the SCADA forces the com-
plete opening(closure) of turbine T1 and T2(T3).
Consequently, tanks S1, S2, and S4 are rapidly emptied.
When a faulty maximum level is measured in S3, the water
availability in the WSS is overestimated, the municipal
tanks are excessively supplied, and thus, the water level in
S3 rapidly decreases. Flow rate sensors are involved in the
regulation of the turbine operations and they also exhibit a
high vulnerability to this kind of error.
The simulation results shown in Figure 5 evidence the
vulnerability of level and flow rate gauges to the most
common types of errors. Moreover, the analysis of the per-
formance indexes in Figure 5(b) underlines that even if the
system does not reach breakdown, errors still lead to signifi-
cant worsening in the economic, energy, and mechanical
performance of the infrastructure. In particular, it is interest-
ing to observe two main trends in the graph. The simulations
related to errors in the level sensors are distributed along the
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index and for the IE index. The simulations of errors in
flow rate sensors, on the other hand, are distributed along
a vertical line, indicating that the main consequence is a
decrease in energy (and mechanical, if the intensity of the
marker fill is observed) performances.
Application of the validation algorithm
After the analysis of the WSS vulnerability to faults in sen-
sors, the above-presented algorithm for real-time fault
detection and measurement selection was integrated in the
control model of the WSS. First, the available gauges in
the different districts of the WSS were checked (hardware
redundancy). Second, the balance equations that provide
an additional value of the measured physical variables
were written (analytical redundancy). Third, for each one
of the considered sensors, the algorithm reported in Figure 1
was coded. Finally, different error scenarios were simulated
to evaluate the efficiency of the integration in the control
model of the error detection algorithm.
To show in detail how the control system operates,
Figure 6 reports the results for the assessment of level
measurement for the inline tank S1. Figure 6(a) shows the
redundant signals of the tank water level. Figure 6(b) depicts
the results of error assessment by the fault detection
algorithm.
As introduced in Figure 3(a), two level sensors are
installed in each inline tank (MH1 and MH2 in Figure 3(a)),
providing hardware redundancy. A third value of the tank
level is obtained using a mass balance equation of the flow
rate into and out of the tank, measured by sensors MQIN
and MQOUT (Figure 3(a)). The combination of hardware
and analytical redundancy guarantees three simultaneous
measurements of the same physical variable.
In the exemplifying scenario reported in Figure 6, the
level sensor MH1 (continuous line in Figure 6(a), 6(c), 6(d)
and 6(e)) is affected by multiple consecutive errors: (1)
drifts, (2) minimum and (3) full-scale constant values, (4)
abrupt oscillations, and (5) transmission interruption. The
level sensor MH2 (dotted line in Figure 6(a), 6(c), 6(d) and
6(e)) and the flow rate sensors MQIN and MQOUT operate
correctly instead, and they are only disturbed by slight
random errors due to instrumental precision (Figure 6(e)).Notice that, instrumental errors in the flow rate sensors scar-
cely affect the precision of the level value (dashed line in
Figure 6(e)) obtained from the balance equation.
As shown in Figure 6(a), the level measured by sensor
MH2 is almost equal to the value resulting from the balance
equation. On the other hand, the level acquired byMH1 con-
siderably differs from the previous ones, due to instrumental
failures. By means of the residual analysis, the developed
algorithm detects with high precision these failures.
Figure 6(c) shows in detail the early detection of the drift
error. In the first panel, the three curves are very closed
one to each other. However, residuals R1 and R3, in the
second and fourth panels, exceed their respective tolerance
thresholds represented by the dashed lines. As a conse-
quence, MH1 is marked as faulty in the last panel. In
Figure 6(b), the outcomes of this error detection procedure
are highlighted for all the simulation time. Besides error
detection, the algorithm selects in real-time the most reliable
measurement (Figure 6(b) and 6(c)) to be used in the WSS
control operations. Under ordinary conditions, the algor-
ithm alternatively selects the value measured by one of the
two level sensors MH1 and MH2. In case of error detection
for MH1, the measurement transmitted by MH2 is the only
one to be selected. As shown in Figure 6(b), the level
value obtained from the balance equation is never identified
as erroneous because the flow meters involved in the bal-
ance operate correctly. Furthermore, the value is never
selected by the algorithm as the reference datum for the con-
trol operations. In fact, the direct measurements from level
sensor MH1 and MH2 are always favored to the indirect
one. In any case, the level measurement obtained from the
balance is fundamental for the operation of the error identi-
fication algorithm as it guarantees the triple redundancy on
which the algorithm is based.
Performances of the WSS with application of the
validation algorithm
The simulations of the response of the system to faulty sen-
sors, discussed above and reported in Figure 5, were
performed again. This time, the algorithm for the identifi-
cation of measurement errors was introduced into the
control system. As for the previous analysis, for each one
of the considered level and flow rate measurements, three
Figure 6 | (a) Level Q7values from level sensorsMH1 (continuous line) and MH2 (dotted line) and from the balance equation of flow rate into and out of the tank (dashed line). Measurements
transmitted by MH1 experience (1) drifts, (2) minimum and (3) full-scale constant values, (4) abrupt oscillations, and (5) transmission interruptions. (b) Error detection and
measurement selection by the fault detection algorithm. (c) Zoom of the early detection of the drift error. As in Figure 4, the three residuals R1, R2, and R3 are reported with the
extremes of their tolerance ranges (dashed lines). (d) Zoom of the abrupt oscillations (4). (e) Zoom of the signal showing errors due to instrumental precision.
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by (i) drift, and (ii) faulty full-scale and (iii) minimum con-
stant values. Precision errors were simulated for the
second redundant sensor and for the sensors involved in
the indirect quantification of the third redundant measure-
ment. For each scenario, the WSS dynamics were
reproduced for a period of one month.
Results show that in all the simulated scenarios, the
algorithm accurately identifies errors in sensors and trans-
mits reliable measurements to the remote-control system.
In this way, adjustments of the control devices (turbines
and valves) are regularly managed and critical situationsthat compromise the safety of the aqueduct are prevented.
The positive feedback of the system to the introduction of
the fault detection algorithm is at first assessed observing
that the IT index is equal to 1 for all the error scenarios.
This indicates that the WSS operates without criticalities
for the entire duration of the simulation. However, the IT
index is not enough to evaluate the improvement of the
system performance for the scenarios in which the WSS
proved to be resilient even in the absence of the error
identification algorithm (i.e., scenarios with IT ¼ 1 in
Figure 5(a)). For these cases, we calculated the difference
between the IE, IW , and IM performance indexes after
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cedure (Figure 7).
Results reveal a general increase in the energy index
(ΔIE), in particular when errors are detected in the flow
rate sensors (Q1 to Q5). In fact, the correct regulation of
the flow rate through the turbines guarantees the optimiz-
ation of the hydroelectricity production.
Water saving (ΔIW) is enhanced when the error detec-
tion algorithm is applied to level sensors. The water level
is the control parameter for the flow rate towards the
tanks. When levels are properly measured, the excessive
supply of water for the inline and municipal tanks is
avoided, thus limiting overflow conditions.
The mechanical index (ΔIM) significantly increases when
the signal from the flow rate sensors is verified. As men-
tioned in Equation (3), these measurements are involved
in the balance equations that control the flow rate through
the turbines. When the flow rate sensors are faulty, these
water balances are only met at the monitoring level but
not in the hydraulic system. This results in continuous
adjustments of the flow through the turbines. Conversely,
when flow rate measurements are assessed, the number of
turbine operations is minimized. The implementation of
the algorithm induces instead a slight decrease in the mech-
anical index, when level sensors are stuck on the minimum
value (circle markers for level sensors in Figure 7(c)). How-
ever, this decrease proves that the WSS is operating
properly. In fact, as discussed in the ‘Case study’ section,
when a minimum constant value is erroneously measured
in one of the municipal tanks, the control system automati-
cally supplies the tank with an emergency constant flow rate
from the water main. Due to this constant flow rate, theFigure 7 | Increment of the performance indices IE (a), IW (b), and IM (c) after the introduction
report the results of simulations with drift (constant minimum value) errors in the snatural variation of water supply given by consumptions in
the municipalities is reduced, as well as the adjustments of
the flow rate through the turbines. When level sensors
in the inline tanks are stuck on the minimum constant
value, turbines are either completely open or completely
closed. Therefore, in these cases, the control operations of
the WSS are less dynamic, the number of turbine maneuvers
decreases, but also the energy and water saving perform-
ances evidently worsen. In fact, a negative ΔIM index is
always followed by positive ΔIE and ΔIW indices.DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this work, an algorithm is proposed for real-time assess-
ment of data measured in the SCADA system of modern
and multipurpose WSSs. An automated remote-control
system based on reliable flow rate and level measurements
is crucial for the safe and optimal operations of these
water infrastructures. The developed algorithm compares
redundant data provided by both redundant sensors and
analytical models. By means of the analysis of residuals, fail-
ures and gross errors in sensors are detected. Moreover, the
algorithm performs a real-time selection of the most reliable
measurements to be used in the control operations.
The effectiveness of the method was assessed through
numerical simulations of a coupled hydraulic and control
model of an alpine WSS, taken as case study. The con-
sidered WSS is currently under construction and thus real
datasets from sensors are not available. However, the most
common measurement errors have been carefully simulated,
based on the technical specifications of the sensors mostQ7of the fault detection algorithm in the control system of the WSS. Triangle (circle) markers
ensors.
Q3
Q4
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simulations, the system vulnerability to different types of
errors in sensors was first analyzed. Four performance indi-
ces were defined to assess the achievement of safety, energy,
mechanical and water supply targets of the water infrastruc-
ture in the different scenarios. Results showed that in most
cases, errors in sensors critically undermine the operation
of the WSS. Moreover, the most vulnerable sensors were
clearly identified. Then, the proposed algorithm was intro-
duced in the control model. The simulations revealed that
the algorithm ensures error detection with a high degree
of accuracy and guarantees continuity in the system oper-
ations. As a result, the performance indices showed a
noticeable increase.
The developed algorithm is robust and easy to
implement. Moreover, the proposed tools for modeling the
hydraulic behavior of the WSS, its control system, and
sensor errors are useful to carry out preliminary studies on
the performance and safety of a WSS in the design phase.
Within this approach, hardware redundancy can be
optimized.
The algorithm can verify the reliability of a control vari-
able only in the case of a single faulty sensor among those
involved in the estimation of the three redundant estimates
of the variable. In the event of multiple, simultaneous
errors the algorithm is not effective. Also, water leaks can
disturb the hydraulic balances involved in the analytically
redundant measurements. In this case, if the corresponding
sensors (hardware redundancy) are not faulty, the algorithm
identifies the presence of an error in the hydraulic balance
and can thus help in localizing water leaks. Once detected,
water leaks must be fixed, or the balance equation
implemented in the algorithm must be modified to take
these outflows into account. If one of the two redundant sen-
sors is out of order, the unexpected occurrence of water
leaks precludes the correct functioning of the algorithm.
At the state-of-the-art, the method therefore requires that
in the event of a sensor malfunction, a maintenance inter-
vention on site is arranged in a short time so as to prevent
a second failure being added to the first one. Another
aspect to be considered for the application of the proposed
FDI in real WSSs is the frequency for sensor data validation.
The fault detection algorithm should assess data with a fre-
quency that is in line with the measurement frequency ofthe sensors, and with the speed of the WSS dynamics. All
these aspects, i.e., the frequency of sensor maintenance, in-
site human intervention, and data validation, are case-
dependent and should be examined during the design of
the control and fault detection system.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge SMAT Group for the financial
support to this research and for providing valuable
information.REFERENCESAnghileri, D., Castelletti, A., Pianosi, F., Soncini-Sessa, R. &
Weber, E.  Optimizing watershed management by
coordinated operation of storing facilities. Journal of Water
Resources Planning and Management 139 (5), 492–500.
Balaban, E., Saxena, A., Bansal, P., Goebel, K. F. & Curran, S.
 Modeling, detection, and disambiguation of sensor
faults for aerospace applications. IEEE Sensors Journal
9 (12), 1907–1917.
Bel, G. & Warner, M. E.  Inter-municipal cooperation and
costs: Expectations and evidence. Public Administration
93 (1), 52–67.
Boukhris, A., Giuliani, S. & Mourot, G.  Rainfall–runoff multi-
modelling for sensor fault diagnosis. Control Engineering
Practice 9 (6), 659–671.
Burnell, D.  Auto-validation of district meter data. In:
Proceedings of the CCWI’03 Conference In Advances in
Water Supply Management, 15–17 September, London, UK,
pp. 13–22.
Carrera, L., Mysiak, J. & Crimi, J.  Droughts in Northern Italy:
Taken by Surprise, Again. Review of Environment, Energy
and Economics (Re3).
Casillas, M., Puig, V., Garza-Castañón, L. & Rosich, A. 
Optimal sensor placement for leak location in water
distribution networks using genetic algorithms. Sensors
13 (11), 14984–15005.
Chen, J. & Patton, R. J.  Robust Model-based Fault Diagnosis
for Dynamic Systems. Springer Science & Business Media 3.
Ciavatta, S., Pastres, R., Lin, Z., Beck, M. B., Badetti, C. & Ferrari,
G.  Fault detection in a real time monitoring network for
water quality in the lagoon of Venice (Italy). Water Science
and Technology 50 (11), 51–58.
Coelho, B. & Andrade-Campos, A.  Efficiency achievement in
water supply systems-A review. Renewable and Sustainable
Energy Reviews 30, 59–84.
Cugueró-Escofet, MÀ, Quevedo, J., Alippi, C., Roveri, M., Puig, V.,
García, D. & Trovò, F.  Model-vs. data-based approaches
Q5
Q6
16 S. Fellini et al. | Fault detection in sensors for remote-control in a water supply system Journal of Hydroinformatics | in press | 2019
Uncorrected Proofapplied to fault diagnosis in potable water supply networks.
Journal of Hydroinformatics 18 (5), 831–850.
EC (European Communities)  Directive 2000/60/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a
Framework for Community Action in the Field of Water
Policy. OJ L327, 22.12.2000.
Eliades, D. & Polycarpou, M.  A fault diagnosis and security
framework for water systems. IEEE Transactions on Control
Systems Technology 18 (6), 1254–1265.
Fellini, S., Vesipa, R., Boano, F. & Ridolfi, L.  Multipurpose
design of the flow-control system of a steep water main.
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
144 (2), 05017018.
Fellini, S., Vesipa, R., Boano, F. & Ridolfi, L.  Real-time
measurement fault detection and remote-control in amountain
water supply system. In: HIC 2018. 13th International
Conference onHydroinformatics, Vol. 3 (G. LaLoggia,G. Freni,
V. Puleo & M. De Marchis eds), pp. 698–705.
Frank, P. M.  Analytical and qualitative model-based fault
diagnosis – a survey and some new results. European Journal
of Control 2 (1), 6–28.
Frank, P. M. & Ding, X.  Survey of robust residual generation
and evaluation methods in observer-based fault detection
systems. Journal of Process Control 7 (6), 403–424.
Frank, P. M. & Köppen-Seliger, B.  Fuzzy logic and neural
network applications to fault diagnosis. International Journal
of Approximate Reasoning 16 (1), 67–88.
Fuller, W. A. Measurement Error Models. JohnWiley & Sons,
New York, USA.
Gabrys, B. & Bargiela, A.  Integrated neural based system for
state estimation and confidence limit analysis in water
networks. In: Proceedings of European Simulation
Symposium ESS’96, Genoa, pp. 398–402.
Gao, Z., Cecati, C. & Ding, S. X.  A survey of fault diagnosis
and fault-tolerant techniques-Part I: Fault diagnosis with
model-based and signal-based approaches. IEEE
Transactions on Industrial Electronics 62 (6), 3757–3767.
Gertler, J.  Survey of model-based failure detection and isolation
in complex plants. IEEE Control SystemsMagazine 8 (6), 3–11.
Gertler, J.  Fault Detection and Diagnosis. Springer, London,
UK.
Goupil, P.  AIRBUS state of the art and practices on FDI and
FTC in flight control system. Control Engineering Practice
19 (6), 524–539.
Hwang, I., Kim, S., Kim, Y. & Seah, C.  A survey of fault
detection, isolation, and reconfiguration methods. IEEE
Transactions on Control Systems Technology 18 (3), 636–653.
Isermann, R. Model-based fault-detection and diagnosis–status
and applications. Annual Reviews in Control 29 (1), 71–85.
Izquierdo, J., López, P. A., Martínez, F. J. & Pérez, R.  Fault
detection in water supply systems using hybrid (theory anddata-driven) modelling. Mathematical and Computer
Modelling 46 (3–4), 341–350.
JCGM J  Evaluation of Measurement Data–Guide to the
Expression of Uncertainty in Measurements. Joint Committee
for Guides in Metrology.
Krause, A., Leskovec, J., Guestrin, C., Van Briesen, J. & Faloutsos,
C.  Efficient sensor placement optimization for securing
large water distribution networks. Journal of Water Resources
Planning and Management 134 (6), 516–526.
Maki, Y. & Loparo, K. A.  A neural-network approach to fault
detection and diagnosis in industrial processes. IEEE
Transactions on Control Systems Technology 5 (6), 529–541.
Massarutto, A.  Agriculture, water resources and water
policies in Italy. Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italy.
Meseguer, J. & Quevedo, J.  Real-time monitoring and control
in water systems. In: Real-time Monitoring and Operational
Control of Drinking-Water Systems. Springer, Cham,
Switzerland, pp. 1–19.
Meseguer, J., Puig, V. & Escobet, T.  Fault diagnosis using a
timed discrete-event approach based on interval observers:
Application to sewer networks. IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man and Cybernetics: Part A 40 (5), 900–916.
Mourad, M. & Bertrand-Krajewski, J. L.  A method for
automatic validation of long time series of data in urban
hydrology. Water Science and Technology 45 (4–5), 263–270.
Özyurt, D. B. & Pike, R. W.  Theory and practice of
simultaneous data reconciliation and gross error detection
for chemical processes. Computers & Chemical Engineering
28 (3), 381–402.
Piatyszek, E., Voignier, P. & Graillot, D.  Fault detection on a
sewer network by a combination of a Kalman filter and a
binary sequential probability ratio test. Journal of Hydrology
230 (3–4), 258–268.
Pukelsheim, F.  The three sigma rule. The American
Statistician 48 (2), 88–91.
Quevedo, J., Puig, V., Cembrano, G., Blanch, J., Aguilar, J.,
Saporta, D., Benito, G., Hedo, M. & Molina, A. 
Validation and reconstruction of flow meter data in the
Barcelona water distribution network. Control Engineering
Practice 18 (6), 640–651.
Ragot, J. & Maquin, D.  Fault measurement detection in an
urban water supply network. Journal of Process Control
16 (9), 887–902.
Sharma, A. B., Golubchik, L. & Govindan, R.  Sensor faults:
Detection methods and prevalence in real-world datasets.
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks (TOSN) 6 (3), 23.
Vesipa, R. & Fellini, S.  Instability of the tank-level control
system of water mains in mountainous environments. Journal
of Hydraulic Engineering 145 (7).
Webster, J. G.  The Measurement, Instrumentation and
Sensors Handbook. CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, USA.First received 30 December 2018; accepted in revised form 15 May 2019. Available online 19 June 2019
